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Abstract
Schmalensee (1974) shows that, when the cost functions of
the advertising e¤ort are linear, the monopoly position is only
sustained when the advertisings e¤ectiveness of the incumbent
is relatively high. We show that this result does not hold in a
more general nonlinear cost. The no-entry equilibrium may hold
even when the relative e¤ectiveness of the incumbent is low. This
happens when the size of the market is su¢ ciently low.
1 Introduction
The central question considered in this paper is how an incumbent re-
sponds to the threat of entry by a rival when the advertising variable
is the weapon used either by the latter to attract the incumbents cus-
tomers and by the incumbent to resist any intrusion. We determine
the optimum allocations of advertising e¤ort when the incumbent moves
rst by determining its advertising e¤ort, and then, the rival considers
whether to enter or not. If entering is decided, the optimal entrants
advertising e¤ort is determined. We show that, in equilibrium, the op-
timal behavior of the incumbent may be to deter entry, depending on
the relative e¤ectiveness of its advertising e¤ort and also the size of the
market.
A number of papers (Monahan (1987), Schmalensee (1976)) derived
the optimal advertising e¤orts when the revenue of each rm is deter-
mined by its relative spending in advertising. However, except a brief
analysis by Schmalensee (1974), they are only concerned by the equilib-
rium marketing expenditure of the existing rms. Schmalensee (1974)
who question whether the presence of a dynamic e¤ect of advertising
may lead to a barrier to entry, shows that the incumbent needs a strong
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advantage for the advertising to be of deterrence entry. However, the
type of equilibrium does not depend on the size of the market. We show
that this result is due to the linearity of the advertising cost function.
In a more general nonlinear advertising cost, the size of the market does
matter. An incumbent with a relatively small e¤ectiveness of advertising
can sustain monopoly when the size of its market is su¢ ciently low.
We exclude the price as a marketing decision variable. This assump-
tion can be justied in many markets where there is little price competi-
tion but other factors related to the marketing variable are signicant. In
the pharmaceutical industries, brands use advertising rather than price
to inuence the post-patent competition and then the entry decision of
generic rms (Scott Morton (2000)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the section
2, we specify the model and notation. Section 3 derives the Stackelberg
equilibrium and its properties. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Consider an incumbent rm X and and a rival Y who considers the pos-
sibility to enter into the incumbents market. Let x and y respectively
the advertising spending of the incumbent and the entrant. These quan-
tities measure the number of ads that rms send to consumers1. The
size of the market V is xed. We assume that marginal costs of produc-
tion are constant and equal for the rms. Let m denote the di¤erence
between the price and marginal cost. The incumbent chooses rst its
advertising e¤ort x and then the potential entrant chooses its advertising
e¤ort y under full knowledge of x. Let cX(:) (respectively cY (:)) be the
advertising cost of rm X (respectively rm Y ). We assume that cX is
convex and strictly increasing and similarly for cY with c0Y (0) > 0.
In this paper, we assume that the market-share S of rm X has the
following form:
S =
1
1 + y=x
(1)
where  is a positive parameter that indicates the e¤ectiveness of the
entrants advertising against the incumbents advertising. The market
share of rm Y is 1  S:
The optimization problem of X is
Maximize X = SmV   cX(x) , x  0 (2)
and the program of rm Y is
Maximize Y = (1  S)mV   cY (y) , y  0 (3)
1Schmalensee (1976) adopts the same formulation.
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3 The equilibrium
To analyze the allocation of the advertising spending in this scenario, we
begin by considering the second-stage choice of rm Y . At this second
stage, rm Y takes x as given and chooses y solution to the program
(3). We are interested in deriving the conditions under which the entry
is deterred, that is when y = 0:
Since Y is strictly concave in the strategy y, the maximizer is unique.
The solution is characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the max-
imization problem in (3):
@Y
@y
=  @S
@y
mV   c0Y (y)  0
and
y
@Y
@y
= y

 @S
@y
mV   c0Y (y)

= 0
These are solved easily, and one obtains:
Proposition 1 Let xdet = mV=c0Y (0). Given the advertising spending
x of the incumbent, the optimal reaction y of the potential entrant is null
for x  xdet and strictly positive for 0 < x < xdet with x and y verifying
mV x = (x+ y)2c0Y (y) (4)
In Eq. (4), xdet is the minimum spending of rm X to advertising
necessary to deter rm Y from entering in its market. It represents the
deterrence advertising e¤ort. Moreover, xdet depends positively on the
size of the market, the gross prot margin and the relative e¤ective-
ness of the entrants advertising. When entry is accommodated and the
incumbent choice is xed, there is a positive relationship between the
advertising e¤ort of the entrant and the attractiveness of the market,
measured by mV; but the e¤ect of an increasing of the relative e¤ective-
ness of the entrantadvertising is ambiguous.
We consider now the choice of the rst stage of the incumbent. At
this rst stage, the incumbent chooses its advertising spending x solution
to the program (2). When choosing x, the incumbent rm takes into
account the reaction of the potential entrant describing in proposition
1.
If x  xdet; then y = 0 and S = 1: Eq. (2) implies that the prot of
the incumbent is a decreasing function of x: Consequently, the optimal
choice of the incumbent is obtained at x not greater than xdet:
Lets begin by showing that the constraint x  0 is not binding. We
have:
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Lemma 1 When x ! 0 then y ! 0 and y=x! +1
Furthermore, we have:
Lemma 2 In the limit as x approaches zero, the derivative of X with
respect to x becomes innite.
It follows from lemma 2 that the optimal choice of the incumbent is
positive. We show next that the type of equilibrium, with or without
entry, depends on the sign of the derivative of X at x = xdet:
Consider rst the case in which the derivative dX=dx is negative
for x = xdet: The prot function X of the incumbent has an interior
maximum at a value of x that satises
@S
@x
+
dy
dx
@S
@y

mV = c0X(x) with 0 < x < x
det (5)
The rst term in the left-hand side of Eq. (5) captures the direct e¤ect
of greater advertising e¤ort x by the incumbent on its prot. The second
term represents the strategic e¤ect of x on the choice of the potential
entrant: In this case, the incumbent maximizes its prot by choosing
its advertising spending such that the marginal revenue equals the mar-
ginal cost. Given that this advertising level is smaller than xdet, the
equilibrium is with entry.
Consider second the case in which the derivative dX=dx is not neg-
ative at x = xdet: We need the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The cost function cY (:) is such that, for all y > 0, either
c00Y (y)  c00Y (0) or c00Y (y)=c0Y (y)  c00Y (0)=c0Y (0).
The cost functions cY (:) = (1 + y)a with a  1 verify this hypothesis in
that c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)  c00Y (0)=c0Y (0) 8y > 0.
We have:
Lemma 3 Under the above hypothesis, the marginal revenue of the in-
cumbent for all x such that 0 < x < xdet is superior to its marginal
revenue at x = xdet:
Let R =
@S
@x
+
dy
dx
@S
@y
: We deduce from lemma 3 that R(x) >
R(xdet)  c0X(xdet)  c0X(x) for all 0 < x < xdet: It follows that dX=dx
is positive for 0 < x < xdet and the prot function of the incumbent is
then strictly increasing. Consequently, the incumbent chooses an adver-
tising spending equal to xdet and entry is deterred.
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For simplicity, let take c0Y (0) = 1:We show easily that the derivative
of X for x = xdet is given by
dX
dx
 
x = xdet

=
1
 (2 +mV c00Y (0))
  c0X(mV )
Proposition 2 When the size of the market V and gross prot margin
are xed, there exists a threshold level  such that the equilibrium is
of deterrence entry if  is not greater than : When the relative e¤ec-
tiveness of entrants advertising and gross prot margin are xed, there
exists a threshold level V  such that the equilibrium is of deterrence en-
try if the size of the market V is not greater than V . Furthermore, in
general2,  and V  are monotonically and negatively related.
Let x the e¤ectiveness of rms and vary the protability of the
market measured by mV: When increasing its advertising spending, the
incumbent compares its marginal revenue with its increasing marginal
cost. When the protability of the market is high, the incentive for
the incumbent to deter entry is high. But the reaction of the entrant
is aggressive for the same reason. The incumbent needs then a high
investment in advertising to succeed in protecting its monopoly position.
In this case, the marginal cost is superior to the marginal revenue and
then the incumbent prefers accommodates entry. In contrast, when the
protability is not high, because of soft reaction of the entrant, the
incumbent rm increases its prot by spending more in advertising. In
this case, the incumbent prefers a strategy of deterrence entry.
Corollary 3 (Schmalensee (1974)) When the marginal costs of the
advertising e¤ort are constant, then the type of equilibrium is indepen-
dent of the size of the market. The equilibrium is of deterrence entry
when the relative e¤ectiveness of entrants advertising is not greater than
1/2.
Proof. We give a second proof that helps to understand what hap-
pens special when the advertising cost functions are linear. Let x
the parameter  and consider a change in the size of the market from
V to V: Firm Xs prot function can be rewritten as X(x; y; V ) =
S(x; y)mV   cX(x) where y is the best reaction of the entrant that de-
pends on x such that the pair (x; y) veries Eq. (4). The minimum
advertising spending xdet that dissuades entry is then multiplied by .
Eq. (4) yields that the entrant must choose an advertising spending
equals to y when the incumbent chooses the level x. Given that
2A su¢ cient condition is c00Y (y) > 0; for all y:
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X(x; y; V ) = X(x; y; V ), it follows that the incumbent changes
its advertising spending and is optimally multiplied by the same factor
. Consequently, the type of equilibrium is not modied.
4 Conclusion
Schmalensee (1974) considers the optimal advertising expenditure of the
Stackelberg leader incumbent who may induce the potential entrant not
to enter. He shows that the incumbent needs a strong advantage for the
advertisings e¤ectiveness to be of deterrence entry. Furthermore, the
equilibrium achieved does not depend on the size of the market. In this
paper, by considering the advertising measured in units of ads, we allow
the advertising cost functions to be nonlinear. We showed that the type
of equilibrium depends on the relative e¤ectiveness of advertising, as
stated by Schmalensee, and also of the size of the market. In contrast to
what stated by Schmalensee, an incumbent rm with a relatively small
e¤ectiveness of advertising may resist any intrusion into its market if
the size of the market is su¢ ciently small. Ellison and Ellison (2000) re-
ports evidence that drugs with higher revenues are most likely to attract
generic entry. Scott Morton (2000) analyzes the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry and question whether pre-expiration brand advertising deters
generic entry. She shows that the market attractiveness, measured by
pre-expiration brand revenue, is the most important factor determining
the number of entrants.
References
[1] Ellison, G., Ellison, S., 2000. Strategic Entry Deterrence and the
Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration,
mimeo.
[2] Monahan, G., 1987. The Structure of Equilibrium in Market Share
Attraction Models, Management Science 33, 228-43.
[3] Schmalensee, R., 1974. Brand Loyalty and Barriers to entry, South-
ern Economic Journal 40, 579-588.
[4] Schmalensee, R., 1976. A model of Promotional competition in
Oligopoly , The Review of Economic Studies 43, 493-507.
[5] Scott Morton, F., 2000. Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising, and
Generic Entry in the U. S. Pharmaceutical Industry, International
Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 1085-1104.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Eq. (4) yields mV x  2y2c0Y (y)  2y2c0Y (0): Then 0 < y2  mV x=(c0Y (0)):
It follows that y ! 0 for x ! 0: Also, it comes from Eq. (4) that
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y=x =
p
mV=(xc0Y (y))   1: Since xc0Y (y) ! 0 for x ! 0, hence
y=x! +1 for x ! 0:
B Proof of Lemma 2
Let R =
@S
@x
+
dy
dx
@S
@y
: From equation (4) and by applying the envelope
theorem, we obtain the derivative dy=dx and then we have
R=
y
(x+ y)2
  c
0
Y (y)
mV

mV   2(x+ y)c0Y (y)
2(x+ y)c0Y (y) + (x+ y)2c
00
Y (y)

=
yc0Y (y)
(x+ y)2c0Y (y)
  c
0
Y (y)
mV

mV   2(x+ y)c0Y (y)
2(x+ y)c0Y (y) + (x+ y)2c
0
Y (y)c
00
Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

=
y
x
c0Y (y)
mV
  c
0
Y (y)
mV

mV (x+ y)  2mV x
2(mV x) + mV x(x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

=
y
x
c0Y (y)
mV
  c
0
Y (y)
mV

mV (y   x)
22mV x+ mV x(x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

=
y
x
c0Y (y)
mV
  c
0
Y (y)
mV

mV (y=x  1)
22mV + mV (x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

Hence
R(x)=
y
x
c0Y (y)
mV

1  
2 + (x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

+
c0Y (y)
mV

1
2 + (x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)
 (A)
LetA =
y
x
c0Y (y)
mV

1  
2 + (x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

andB =
c0Y (y)
mV

1
2 + (x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

:
We deduce form lemma 1 that B ! c0Y (0)
2mV
and A! +1 for x! 0.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Let retake Eq. (A). For x = xdet; R = A + B with A = 0 and B =
c0Y (0)
mV

1
2 + xdetc00Y (0)=c
0
Y (0)

: If 0 < x < xdet we have A > 0: It su¢ ces
to show that
c0Y (y)
mV

1
2 + (x+ y)c00Y (y)=c
0
Y (y)

 c
0
Y (0)
mV

1
2 + xdetc00Y (0)=c
0
Y (0)

As c0Y (y)  c0Y (0) and the hypothesis holds, we need to show that (x +
y)  xdet for each (x; y) verifying Eq. (4). By Eq. (4) we have mV x =
(x + y)2c0Y (y) and mV x
det = (xdet)2c0Y (0): For 0 < x < x
det; (x +
y)2c0Y (y)  mV xdet = (xdet)2c0Y (0)  (xdet)2c0Y (y):
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